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Abstract 
Patrick Wilson’s writings have proven to be the foundation for much of our thinking about the organization of 
documents and their subtle connection to power structures that govern their construction and use. His examinations 
of public versus private knowledge, for example, expand how we understand individual and social epistemology 
within the field. In his writings, however, Wilson speaks as an idealist, generally glossing over the problem of how 
technologies mediate and impact the relationship between people, on the one hand, and the circulation and 
constitution of knowledge, on the other. He did not analyze how knowledge organization structures (KO) could be 
effective for some people or some forms of knowledge, and ineffective for others, nor did he analyze similarly the 
constitutive components of KO as they relate to the differential effects on the use of knowledge. We posit that 
pluralistic modes of understanding KO are a fruitful way forward for the discipline. This paper conceptualizes how 
we can build on Wilson’s critical conversations about epistemology in the domain of KO from three specific angles: 
KO as pluralized space, a political economy of KO, and KO and political pragmatics. 
 
Introduction 
Patrick Wilson’s writings have proven to be the foundation for much of our thinking about 
the organization of documents and their subtle connection to power structures that govern 
their construction and use (Wilson, 1968). Wilson had much to say as well about 
epistemology and how we can understand the nuanced relationships between public versus 
private knowledge (Wilson, 1977). Public knowledge, private ignorance: Toward a library 
and information policy (1977) makes the claim that, despite the wealth of public knowledge 
available, most decisions are asserted based on unreliable information, as most individuals 
use second-hand knowledge (Wilson, 1983), personal documents, and biased (and usually, 
faulty) memories (1977, pp. 35–44). Wilson sees the library and librarians as a remedy to 
this ‘private ignorance.’ In part, this ideal library service would rely on a complete library 
(1977, p. 87), and a complete understanding of the bibliographical instruments that organize 
these documents (Wilson, 1968, Chapter 4). 
As presented here, in this synopsis, Wilson is speaking as an idealist. As laudable as it is, 
such a model is associated with a few assumptions regarding knowledge: 
• all people possess the ability to access and use knowledge 
• the nature of public knowledge is generally reliable, free of error, and bias 
• the mediation of access to knowledge is also free of error and bias 
The reality of the contemporary situation, however, is that the above assumptions no 
longer hold true, especially given the extent to which instruments of access (catalogs, search 
engines, etc.) are mediated by technologies that are far removed from public intervention, 
rendering their mechanisms invisible. If one were to identify a simplified version of most 
access scenarios in-line with Wilson’s oeuvre, we could imagine a schematic that includes 
these three upper-level domains, 
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• The domain of people (individuals, personal and social relationships, etc.) 
• The domain of knowledge organization (KO) 
• The domain of knowledge (as contained in, extrapolated from, and distributed by 
and through information, documents, and bibliographical objects) 
Patrick Wilson focused on a critical analysis of the first and third areas—that of people 
and knowledge—but did not apply the same analytic to the domain of KO. Regarding people, 
some people have better access to knowledge by being better positioned to take advantage of 
reliable information, while others are poorly positioned to evaluate good information or gain 
access to it. Similarly, some forms of knowledge and information are more reliable that 
others, and the different kinds of information are not equally distributed across various social 
formations. However, this kind of analytic is missing from Wilson’s treatment of KO. While 
Wilson was generally deflationary and skeptical of the role of KO and whether it could 
accomplish its objectives, he did not analyze how KO could be effective for some people or 
some forms of knowledge, and ineffective for others, nor did he analyze similarly the 
constitutive components of KO as they relate to the differential effects on the use of 
knowledge. We posit that pluralistic modes of understanding KO are a fruitful way forward 
for the discipline.  
 
Use of knowledge 
According to Wilson, public knowledge is a “common possession,” and that “the use and 
benefits of which should be available not to a restricted few but to [humankind] generally” 
(1977, p. 121). So, while people possess the theoretical ability to access—and perhaps an 
ethical entitlement to—information, they often lack the ability to assess, negotiate, and verify 
the information that they are provided. Further, impersonal information sources often are 
financially costly (subscription-based journals for example, require institutional membership 
to access) (1977, p. 54), meaning that access is often restricted by our economic 
circumstances. It is these fundamental access-oriented challenges that prompt Wilson to 
emphasize the importance of libraries and librarians. Of course, with the rise of information 
systems and database-based documents, we are mediating much more than bibliographical 
objects, but data objects in general. 
Knowledge, properly defined on an individual level, is true belief (Wilson, 1977, p. 6). 
True belief is, in part, based on properly evaluating public documents to make conclusions 
about the world. Evaluating documents depends on our ability to relate them with other 
documents within a system.  
 
Nature of knowledge 
Knowledge is as much a social object as it is a construct for individual people. For Wilson, 
knowledge is gained through both documentary and social means—and it is a mixture of 
these two sources that allows one to conclude the reliability or unreliability of information. 
As defined by Jesse H. Shera, social epistemology is the study of “function of recorded 
information in the actual working of society” (Shera, 1965, p. ix), and lies at the heart of the 
discipline of Information Studies, focused as it is on the “intellectual products” (Egan & 
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Shera, 1952, p. 132; quoted by Furner, 2004, p. 793) of a discipline and its subsequent 
organization into graphical mediums of communication to satisfy individual and group 
“epistemic needs” (Fuller, 2009, p. 4799). Patrick Wilson’s (1983) extended investigation 
into cognitive authority gives a sense of how knowledge circulates within social spaces, how 
such knowledge is legitimated, and finally, how it is accessed within systemic access 
environments. Much of our information is gathered through our interpersonal networks. This 
information collected through social networks, as Wilson makes clear, is heavily weighted 
in decision-making, yet the weight it is afforded does not necessarily reflect the quality of 
knowledge it represents. 
 
Reinvigorating Discussion of KO on Wilson’s Terms: Mediation of access to knowledge 
As Bruce Shuman (1978) identified, in Public Knowledge Wilson did not broach how 
“questions of technology” (Wilson, 1977, p. viii) might impact our use of public knowledge, 
particularly how technology shape and limit our ability to access public knowledge. 
Transparent knowledge organization systems are vital to decreasing private ignorance. In 
1968, ten years prior to the publication of Public Knowledge, Wilson focused specifically on 
the question of access to knowledge in Two Kinds of Power (1968). In it, Wilson describes 
how an ideal bibliographical instrument would be one that is understandable and navigable 
by a user. Wilson states, “to discover what I can or might do if I would, I must discover the 
arrangements there are of which I can take advantage … I cannot make the distinction 
accurately, however, without knowledge of the Specifications of the instrument, the rules 
according to which it was constructed” (1968, pp. 55, 59). In Wilson’s conception, an 
instrument is the apparatus within which documents (broadly construed) are contained. An 
assessment of methods of access to knowledge--including for example, user assessments of 
document relevance--means understanding the limitations of the instruments that mediate our 
access to information.  
This view of the “bibliographical instrument,” while extended, is (1) speculative in nature, 
and (2) depends upon the possibility that an instrument can be enumerated in terms of 
available positions and social roles, for example (1968, p. 63). The archetypical catalog and 
encyclopedia are used as primary examples. And while there is a tacit acknowledgement that 
the growth of the instrument is an inevitability (1968, p. 63), the near-endless bounds of 
something akin to Google’s documentary index is beyond the model constructed. Mechanical 
classification—and especially mechanized classification through computation—is not really 
Wilson’s focus. People are still very much seen at the center of instrumental activity: “‘By 
automatic, or mechanical selection’ I do not, of course, mean selection by a machine, but the 
selection that can be done by people in a mechanical, ‘machine like’ way.” (1968, p. 62). 
These limitations have a deep impact on whether or not public knowledge can be achieved 
properly within individual realms of knowledge discovery and processing.  
This gap in Wilson’s analysis leaves room to expand his analysis, especially when we look 
toward the changes in contemporary circumstances and the ‘instruments’ that define our new 
and distributed notions of information and documentary access. Technologies of all types 
need to analyzed in light of this new analytic, including and especially algorithms, which 
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have become a nearly-ubiquitous, and equally (and dangerously) silent, aspect of our social 
landscape.  
 
Extending Wilson’s Critique 
In addition to his framework of users/KO/knowledge, we see in Wilson as a precursor to a 
more overt social and political analysis of the three domains. Within the realm of users, some 
people are better positioned to take advantage of systems of knowledge, because they have 
better informed social networks, or are able to make use of the mechanisms of access to 
knowledge. While he has not yet come to the full realization of mapping such an analytic to 
larger social formations like race, gender and class, he has begun the analytic that not all 
individuals bear equal status in access and the use of knowledge. For example, evolving 
concepts of epistemic justice (e.g. Fricker 2007) emphasize a “distributive unfairness” in 
epistemic goods such as when “interpretive [cognitive] resources put someone at an unfair 
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences.” Before 
emphasizing a political economy to the distribution of knowledge, we must first acknowledge 
that not everyone is equally capable of using information, due to inherent unfairness in 
educational systems, among other structural inequalities. As an additional example, there are 
competing models of knowledge use, such as those made apparent in consumerist vs. 
participatory relations to culture (for example, Postman 1985 vs. Jenkins 2006). 
Wilson provides an early analytic of knowledge as well, providing a beginning for a full-
blown critique. For example, his distinction between public and private knowledge also 
incorporates the notion of reliability: private knowledge, for example, is susceptible, 
characterized as unreliable and incomplete. The title of the 1977 book, after all, contrasts the 
vices of private ignorance with the positive virtues of public knowledge. Wilson should be 
credited for an early initial foray in the structure of knowledge, which opens up the possibility 
of further critique within KO. Such a critique could account for gaps, contradictions, and 
other vices within shared knowledge, like in Althusser’s slightly earlier work. According to 
Althusser (1971, p. 153), knowledge can be hegemonic, encoding ideological operations that 
mask the true nature of the individual to his or her reality. Less explicitly political 
characterizations of shared knowledge include Swanson’s 1986 work on “undiscovered 
public knowledge” where he characterizes knowledge as a puzzle whose pieces are 
independently constructed and assembled to reveal “an unseen, unknown and unintended 
pattern” (p. 103). Given the mismatch between the size and growth of knowledge, and limited 
ability of any one person to read even a fraction of printed books, public knowledge is 
accurately represented less as an assembled puzzle revealing previously unseen but shared 
patterns, and is more like a Rorschach test of shifting and resequenced elements revealing 
unstable and privately interpreted patterns. 
Wilson’s critique of KO is at a comparatively simpler stage. He problematizes it with a 
general tone of deflation in the sense that mechanisms and systems of access often 
underperform. He notoriously called their use “stupid”: “The use of bibliographical 
instruments is frequently a stupid activity, as is, I suspect, known more or less clearly to 
many scholars, and provides an excellent reason why they should not do more of it” (1968, 
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p. 118). His focus was on standard bibliographic apparatuses, such as catalogs, indices, and 
traditionally constructed classifications. He did not look at the particular roles of language or 
technology as constituting KO, or how alternative models of either could lead to alternative 
constructions of KO. 
An example of a conceptual tool of analysis that Wilson did use was that of transparency-
-that the effective use of KO tools was predicated on the users’ comprehension of the tools’ 
design and appropriate use. This is a critical concept in the analysis of contemporary KO 
tools, particularly in the assessment of the use of algorithms in KO. Increasingly, 
classification systems that utilize algorithmic means of organization make it difficult to 
evaluate the methods by which they organize documents. Safiya Noble’s analysis of Google 
is a case in point: search engine users, when seeking out words such “black girls” were given 
sexualized and pornified results. Such a circumstance means that public perception of black 
identity is directed to racist and sexualized conceptions. 
We also see a great deal of problems in the biological world, where large-scale data is 
automatically organized into taxonomies that are then used to browse and contextualize the 
data they contain. We can take the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) (GBIF, 
2017) as a prime example. GBIF is the world largest aggregator of biological data, currently 
containing well over one-billion species occurrence records. Dealing with taxonomic data at 
these scales, it is unreasonable to expect human curation for every data record. In order to 
make these data available, GBIF has created their Nub Taxonomy (2016), which is designed 
to serve as the backbone KO architecture for their system. As new species occurrence data is 
ingested into GBIF, the data is algorithmically cleaned and reconciled to a form that is GBIF 
compliant. It is occasionally the case, that during this process, species data is incorrectly 
processed, leading to classification errors. As Robert Mesibov has identified, species data 
can be deleted altogether, up-matched (placed into a higher taxonomic rank than it should 
be), or down-matched (“when a name is particularised … at a level in the taxonomic 
hierarchy below the supplied or appropriate one”). The result of these algorithmically-
introduced errors is that documents cannot be properly assessed at the point of access. 
In both Google’s presentation of “black girls” and the algorithmic grouping of biological 
taxa, the classification is created by an obscured technological system that poses as neutral. 
The lack of transparency is an issue because it becomes difficult to assess the criteria by 
which objects (documents, web pages, organisms, etc.) are grouped. Certainly, the lack of 
transparency in automated systems is a shortcoming that interferes with their effective use, 
and Wilson’s notion of transparency is a useful related concept. However, we would see a 
clearer through-line connecting Wilson to current critiques of the role of algorithms in 
classificatory systems if Wilson had used the concept as part of an analytic critique of KO, 
for example, if he differentiated amongst systems as more or less transparent due to their 
particular use of technology or language. 
 
Plurality  
However, we do see Wilson as one source for understanding users, KO and knowledge as 
pluralized spaces. His work presents a nuanced view of both the social construction of 
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knowledge, as well as the variety of bibliographical works that constitute our various sources 
of information. If one looks closely we can begin to see how Wilson is constructing a social 
and documentary epistemology based on a network of ideas and perspectives—a plurality of 
positionality, perspective and voice. Wilson’s notion of social epistemology in Public 
Knowledge, Private Ignorance (1977), for example, shows how the generation of “truth” with 
regard to individual opinion or decision-making is based on an interconnected set of social 
relations. These relationships necessarily complicate judgement through the various opinions 
and interpretations of many individuals. Further, these opinions are intricately related to 
structures of power such social occupations and other culturally-established distributions of 
knowledge (1977, pp. 45-52). One need only look at the daily headlines today to see how 
‘plural’ our spaces our: turn to Fox News, on the one hand, and the Washington Post, on 
another. As such, knowledge, is derivatively also nuanced, given that they are also plural and 
multivocal. Cognitive authority and decision-making are complex and nuanced, and even 
more so in our contemporary environment.  
Other scholars, such as Hope Olson and Birger Hjørland commit to a similar sense of 
social pluralism. Olson’s feminist critique of subject construction (2008), for example, show 
how a traditional Aristotelian, linear, and hierarchical method of classification exclude 
minoritized positions in accessing knowledge. Olson posits a web-based (and somewhat 
pragmatic) network over such models. Referencing Blythe McVicker Clinchy’s scholarship, 
Olson indicates that networked, connected knowledge lies midway between objective and 
subjective ways of knowing: “connected knowing avoids the adversarial practices of 
traditional philosophy that focus on objectivity and validity, but it does maintain the notion 
of a singular concept of truth” (2008, p. 525). But even so, the ultimate aim for Olson’s 
feminist intervention is to highlight the rejection of ‘one’ singular truth and to design KO 
structures that represent the social relationships that contribute to our belief structures. 
Though not network focused, Hjørland’s notion of domain analysis is useful in this respect. 
Domain analysis is a method of understanding KO structures as emerging from “discourse 
communities” (Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995). Such an approach focuses explicitly on the 
social perspectives in that it pushes for community-specific KO, but it also supports inter-
disciplinary comparison to identify commonalities between different domains. This 
comparative approach similarly highlights the extent to which looking at “social” notions of 
classification and organization is tantamount to looking at many ways of understanding the 
world. 
Extending this notion, we can look to scholars outside of the information and KO 
community for similar expressions, for example, Thomas Khun’s paradigm model of 
knowledge (1996). A paramount idea in Kuhn’s text comes from the use of the term 
“structure “in the title of his book: the notion that collective knowledge evolves through 
identifiable modes and mechanisms—from normality to revolution, knowledge is inherently 
a social mechanism that is facilitated through a network of tools and mediating documents. 
Once again, at the core of Kuhn’s theory is, in part, comparative. Many communities circulate 
within scientific circles and these communities, but even so, there is a flow of information 
between them: “the historian must compare the community's paradigms with each other and 
Robert D. Montoya and Gregory H. Leazer. 2019. Public Knowledge, Private Ignorance, and an Analytic of 
Knowledge Organization. NASKO, Vol. 7. pp. 174-182. 
180 
 
with its current research reports. In doing so, his object is to discover what isolable elements, 
explicit or implicit, the members of that community may have abstracted from their more 
global paradigms and deployed as rules in their research” (1996, pp. 43–44). Structure, then, 
plays an equally-important role in the realm of KO, and so examining paradigmatic trends 
comparatively can help us understand how certain regimes challenge the epistemic authority 
of systems that are meant to provide single access points for inherently plural spaces. 
The end result is that Wilson sets the ground for subsequent examinations that 
acknowledge there are many knowledge domains that we must attend to in both the domain 
of people and the domain of knowledge. So, too, must we examine KO structure as inhabiting 
similar notions of pluralism—or perhaps, more appropriately, imagine new systems and 
theories that embody these values. To this end, we see three-part analytic for understanding 
user, KO, and knowledge. In the first and third of those areas, the analytic extends a 
conversation initiated in part by Wilson, and one that can be extended to KO proper. Our 
analytic conceptualizes that can build on Wilson’s conversation: KO as pluralized space, a 
political economy of KO, and KO and political pragmatics. 
 
Pluralized spaces.  
Perhaps one of the more advanced discussions in our domain is the idea that technologies are 
spaces of multi-vocal arrangements. Not only do communities have their own mechanisms 
of KO, but even within those spaces, perspectives differ and we must attend to these 
differences by arranging new modes of description, metadata application, classifying and 
linking in open environments.  
 
Political economy.  
Within any KO system, domain- or community-centric or otherwise, there are political 
economies with which to contend. Wilson made this connection when examining modes of 
cognitive authority as being integrally tied to institutional arrangements. Certain ideas, 
concepts, and individuals are prioritized over others based on economic, political, and social 
standing. This invariably means that the means for distributive and recognitional justice 
(Mathiesen, 2015) fall short. To this end, community members must also have a mechanism 
for changing existing systems to attend to their individual and community needs—Kay 
Mathiesen (2015, p. 208) highlights this form of “participatory justice” as it relates to 
information access.  
 
Political pragmatics.  
Attending to the theoretical concerns of political economies of KO is one thing, but there are 
also practical mechanisms at work that enact certain political agendas. If one were to look at 
systems such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter we can see there are clear patterns of power 
at work. The ability for certain right-wing organizations to circulate unreliable information 
(unfactual, deceiving information) is a particular way in which the economy of our KO and 
information environments are being pointed in specific directions. Certain epistemic 
communities rise to the top, while others consistently stay on the margins.  
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Conclusion 
As a scholar of his time, Wilson would have certainly been concerned with the distribution 
of educational and information services, particularly in the institutional manifestations such 
as schools and libraries. As the events of 2016 have made abundantly clear, the notion of 
contested facts and the role of disinformation--concerns that certainly predate the US 
Presidential election--are now made apparent on a daily basis. We hope to explore the shifting 
nature of the demarcation and interactions between public knowledge and private knowledge, 
how the interplay between the two is now explicitly political and mediated by uncertain 
computational mechanisms, and is a central element in the political contest of the constitution 
of the public sphere and civil society itself. 
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